Ukraine's Maidan, Russia's War by Mychailo Wynnyckyj

Author:Mychailo Wynnyckyj [Mychailo, Wynnyckyj,]
Language: deu
Format: epub
Publisher: ibidem
Published: 2019-03-18T16:00:00+00:00

Table 2: Reform objectives and major milestones achieved in 2015 and 2016—based on 2015 and 2016 “Reforms Monitoring Progress” reports of the National Reforms Council

By early 2017 it became clear that although much had been done to change Ukraine during the first three post-Maidan years, the reforms had been poorly communicated to the public: poll results showed widespread skepticism of even the most seemingly successful initiatives (e.g. approval of police reform was at 39%, introduction of “ProZorro” in public procurement at 30%).58 Although the Poroshenko administration had been prepared for a drop in its popularity resulting from the implementation of several unpopular initiatives (e.g. raising gas and electricity prices to market rates), the ruling elite’s appetite for further reform gradually evaporated. Attention increasingly shifted to the upcoming election campaigns: Presidential elections were scheduled for March 2019; a Parliamentary vote for October 2019. In early 2017, Ukrainians were granted visa-free travel rights to the EU, and it would seem that Poroshenko deemed this, together with the signing of the EU Association agreement in 2015, to have been enough to fulfil the Maidan demand for European integration. Although health care reform (which had been lagging behind other reform initiatives during the previous two years) was accelerated thanks to the gutsy system-busting efforts of the Acting Minister of Health, Ukrainian Diaspora-born Ulana Suprun, the creation of a specialized anti-corruption court was delayed, and Parliament’s moratorium on the sale of agricultural land extended yet again. Stalled structural reform meant unfulfilled promises to the IMF: the agreed tranche of 1 billion USD scheduled for late 2017 was delayed, and in early 2018, cancellation of the Fund’s Stand-by facility by the end of the year could not be ruled out.59

Sovereign default was avoided in 2015 after successful negotiations with the IMF resulted in significant financial aid.60 However, despite some degree of stabilization, Ukraine emerged from two years of political and social turmoil significantly poorer than it had been at the end of the Yanukovych regime. In the 4th quarter of 2015, a slight uptick in GDP statistics (6% quarter-on-quarter growth) was recorded, and 2.3% year-on-year growth was reported for 2016, but given the extreme decline in industrial production of the previous years, coupled with a doubling of consumer prices, and a more than threefold decline in the value of the currency immediately after Yanukovych’s ouster (from 8:1 UAH:USD to 25:1), minor economic growth was barely noticed. Much needed foreign investment had not materialized largely due to the lack of reform of the Procuracy and judiciary (both affecting perceived security of property rights), and due to infighting within the political class (mutual accusations of corruption) resulting in overall political instability.

At the end of 2016, Ukraine received its last major dose of economic shock-therapy. Since the ouster of Yanukovych, 81 commercial banks had been brought under special administration by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), and eventually closed. The state guaranteed deposits up to 200,000 UAH (approx. 7,000 USD), but any larger deposit amounts were generally lost when an institution was declared insolvent.

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